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EUROPEAN DEFENSE INDUSTRY FROM 2001 TO 2009 





The purpose of this research is to examine and analyze whether or not there was a 
statistically significant reaction in financial markets to the announcements of European 
defense manufacturers’ consolidations for the time period from 2001 to 2009. The 
research focuses on the top four European contractors which are BAE Systems, EADS, 
THALES and Finmeccanica. The analysis will be accomplished with the use of a series 
of event studies, using the arithmetic stock returns of the companies’ against the index of 
the intimate stock exchange market.  
The project will also examine whether the financial markets responded in the 
same manner in different consolidations and in different stock markets. 
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This project examines whether there was a statistically significant reaction in the 
stock price of the four major European aerospace and defense firms to the announcement 
of consolidations (mergers or acquisitions). The companies BAE Systems, EADS, Thales 
and Finmeccanica were chosen for the time frame between 2001 and 2009. 
A great number of event studies were executed and in some cases were executed 
for the same company in different stock markets, in order to examine the reaction of 
different stock markets to the same announcement. 
According to the data analysis there was moderate statistically significant reaction 
of the financial markets to the announcements of consolidation. Specifically, the markets 
responded only twenty-nine percent of the time and showed no response in the remaining 
seventy-one percent of announcements. BAE Systems seems to have triggered the 
financial markets most, with Finmeccanica following in the second place and EADS and 
Thales taking the third and fourth place respectively. As for the reaction of different 
markets to the same announcements the results showed that different markets responded 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A.  BACKGROUND 
The end of the Cold War led to a fall in defense expenditure worldwide, forcing 
global defense industries to make significant changes to their corporate strategy in order 
to overcome the loss in profits. Three broad strategies were implemented (Smith & 
Smith, 1992). The first is termed “consolidation,” where a company stays in the defense 
sector and strengthens its position in key market segments. The second is called 
“diversification,” under which a company reduces its defense dependence through 
organic growth or acquisition of civilian activities. The third strategy is “conversion,” a 
wholesale switch of existing defense plants to civilian production. 
U.S. defense companies led the way by adopting these strategies, triggering a 
mass wave of consolidations (mergers and acquisitions) between 1990 and 2000. The 
European defense firms found themselves under political and economic pressure to 
follow the example of their U.S. counterparts and began a great number of mergers and 
acquisitions that continue to the present (2009).  
B. OBJECTIVE OF STUDY 
This research examines whether there was a statistically significant reaction in the 
stock markets to the defense companies’ announcements of consolidations. The reaction 
of financial markets is a way to evaluate whether a consolidation would result in added 
value to the company or not, since most of the time markets are a subjective judge of the 
effectiveness of any company’s strategic movements. 
The top four European defense companies, which according to their 2004 
financial statements are British Aerospace (BAE Systems), European Aeronautic Defence 
and Space Company N.V. (EADS), Thales and Finmeccanica, were chosen for 




EU Rank World Rank Company Country 2007 Defense Revenue 
1 3 BAE Systems U.K. 29,800.00 
2 7 EADS Multiple 12,239.20 
3 9 Finmeccanica Italy  10,601.60 
4 11 Thales France 7,246.40 
Source: www.defensenews.com 
Table 1.   Top Four European Defense Companies(After Defense News Research) 
BAE seems to be the dominant European defense industry, with EADS following 
with half BAE’s defense revenue. Thales and Finmeccanica come in third and fourth, 
respectively. The time period between 2001 and 2009 was chosen for this study. 
The statistical significance of the stock price arithmetic returns against the relative 
stock market’s index return was used to evaluate every announcement of consolidation. 
The dominance of the examined firms in the defense market is related to the 
number of the consolidations that each company executed. This event study examined 80 
announcements of consolidations, as shown in Table 2   
Contractor Number of Announcements Stock Market Index 
BAE Systems 21 FTSE 100 
EADS 18 EURONEXT 100 
EADS 21 CAC 40 
Thales 8 EURONEXT 100 
Thales 8 CAC 40 
Finmeccanica 4 MIBTEL 
Total 80  
 
Table 2.   Summary of Contractor Examined Consolidation Announcements in the 
Relative Stock Markets 
In some cases, the same announcement was studied across different stock markets 
in order to examine the various reactions to the same announcement. Eighty regression 
analyses were executed and Microsoft’s “Excel” program used to determine the results. 
All regressions were executed twice for robustness in order to minimize any accidental 
mistakes. 
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Most of the data concerning the prices of the stocks and indexes were collected 
from the website of “Yahoo Finance” and the Bloomberg database. The data concerning 
the announcements’ dates were found in the website of each company and were 
corroborated by other available press releases, also found on the web.  
Although the four companies carried out more than the examined consolidations 
during the examined period of time, the lack of verifiable data led the authors to exclude 
from the study any consolidations with poor or unconfirmed data. 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This research paper will try to answer a number of questions concerning the top 
four European defense contractors’ policies relative to consolidations.   
1. Primary Question 
• How did the financial markets respond to the announcement of 
consolidations made by the European defense industry?  
• How did different financial markets respond to the same announcement of 
a European defense firm? 
2. Secondary Questions 
• Did the financial markets respond to the announcement of consolidation in 
the same manner for each of the four examined firms? 
• Which strategy seems to be preferred by the financial markets?  
D. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY 
This research paper is organized into six chapters. The first chapter is an 
introduction to the research.  
Chapter II provides mainly the background information and the literature review. 
It is divided into three sections. Section A briefly presents the history of the European 
defense industry and each one of the examined firms. Section B explains the terms and 
types of mergers. Finally, Section C introduces the current European situation relative to 
defense policy. 
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Chapter III is divided into two sections, with Section Α providing useful 
information concerning the terminology and Section B demonstrating the methodology 
used for the research.  
Chapter IV presents in detail the data analysis, which includes the results from the 
event studies in the form of statistical significance, and makes a quantitative analysis of 
the results.  
Chapter V exhibits the derived conclusions, based on the results of Chapter IV, 
and answers the primary and secondary questions that were posed to define the research.   








II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. THE EUROPEAN DEFENSE INDUSTRY 
1. Introduction 
The defense industry plays a significant role in national defense and grabs a large 
slice of the whole industrial pie. Since the end of Cold War, the global defense industry 
has experienced a wave of mass restructuring, with the United States’ industry leading in 
time and volume. The European defense industry, although falling behind initially, 
eventually responded with restructuring, through a wave of mergers, acquisitions and 
consolidations.  
The term “European,” which is used throughout this thesis, refers to the European 
Union (E.U.) and not the continent of Europe, since many countries that geographically 
belong to Europe are not part of the European Union. It is in the authors’ interest to 
examine the European Defense Industry, which at the moment is the second largest 
defense industry after that of the United States (Coonen, 2006). 
The European defense industry consists of a large number of companies varying 
in size and products, with some diversified into civil production as well. Nowadays more 
than 300 defense companies exist in 14 of the E.U.’s states. Almost every state has a 
defense industry but most of the companies are small or medium size, and mostly build 
components for other major manufacturers or provide support services to the armed 
forces of their respective states (European Defence, n.d.) This paper examines only those 
major European firms that are dominant in the European and global military market, 
taking into consideration their revenues and business turnover. These firms are British 
Aerospace (BAE Systems), European Aeronautic Defense and Space Company N.V.  
(EADS), THALES and Finmeccanica; all were formed recently after mergers, 
acquisitions and consolidations of major European defense firms (Mawdsley, 2003). 
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2. History and Business of the Protagonists 
a. BAE Systems 
British Aerospace (BAE) is a British defense and aerospace company. It 
was first formed in April 1977 by the merger of the British Aircraft Corporation, Hawker 
Siddeley Aviation, Hawker Siddeley Dynamics and Scottish Aviation. The company was 
under national control, but in 1981 it went public after the Thatcher Government sold 
51.57% of its shares in BAE. In 1985 the UK Government sold its remaining shares of 
the company and BAE became an entirely privately-owned company. Nevertheless, for 
national defense issues, according to British law, the foreign ownership in the company is 
limited to 15% and the CEO and the Chairman should be British nationals.  
In 1988, BAE acquired the Rover group, in a trial to diversify its products. 
In 1991, Heckler & Koch Gmbh joined the company as well. In October 1993 BAE 
formed a joined venture company with Marconi Electronic Systems (MES), the defense 
electronics business of the British General Electric Company, in order to develop the 
naval principal anti-air missile system guided weapons project. In July 1998 a merger of 
British Aerospace and DaimlerChrysler Aerospace AG (DASA) was consummated. In 
November 1999, despite prior agreements and the reluctance of the British Government, 
the company merged with the arms dealing side of General Electric Company (GEC) 
Marconi Electronic Systems and a new corporate entity was formed, BAE SYSTEMS 
(Corporate Watch UK, 2002).  This new entity divides its business into the areas of 
Electronics, Intelligence and Support, Land and Armaments, Programs and Support, 
International Businesses, and other businesses (Investis, 2007).  
After the formation of BAE Systems various other acquisitions mergers 
and sales took place. Some of the most interesting are the following: in June 2004 Alvis 
Vickers merged with BAE and formed BAE Systems and Land. In March 2005 BAE 
Systems acquired United Defense Industries (UDI), a U.S. defense company that 
manufactures land systems. The new BAE Systems Land and Armaments is a major 
manufacturer of combat vehicles, artillery systems, naval guns, missile launchers and 
guided munitions. In December 2005 BAE sold its subsidiary Atlas Electronic to 
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ThyssenKrupp and EADS.  In July 2007 Armor Holdings, a manufacturer of tactical 
wheeled vehicles, merged with BAE Systems. In June 2008 BAE acquired the major 
Australian defense company Tenix Defense and formed BAE Systems Australia, the 
largest defense contractor in the country. In April 2008 BAE also acquired the South 
African company IST Dynamics. Finally, in 2008 BAE Systems merged its surface 
shipbuilding operations with the Vosper Thornycroft (VT) Group, forming BVT Surface 
Fleet. As for the company’s activity in civil production, in October 2006 the company 
sold its share in Airbus to EADS, ending its involvement in civil airliner production.  
b. European Aeronautic Defense and Space Company N.V. (EADS) 
The European Aeronautic Defense and Space Company (EADS) is a 
European aerospace corporation. It was formed in July 2000 by the merger of Daimler 
Chrysler Aerospace AG (DASA) of Germany, Aerospatiale-Matra of France and 
Construcciones Aeronauticas SA (CASA) of Spain. First came the merger between the 
DASA and CASA in June 1999; the three companies further consolidated in October 
1999 to create EADS. EADS became the second largest aerospace company in the world 
and the second largest arms manufacturer in Europe. The company does business in the 
areas of military aircraft, missiles, space rockets, satellites and related systems (EADS, 
2008).   
After its creation, the new company made the following acquisitions and 
mergers: in April 2001 its missile business (Aérospatiale-Matra Missiles) merged with 
the respective arm of BAE Systems and Alenia Marconi Systems, Matra BAe Dynamics 
(MBD), and formed MBDA. In June 2003 EADS acquired total ownership of Astrium, a 
space and satellite manufacturer, to create EADS Astrium. In October 2006 EADS 
acquired BAE’s share in Airbus and became the sole owner of the company. In 
December 2005 EADS joined with Northrop Grumman (NG) to bid for the U.S. Air 
Force’s KC-30 tanker program. Although in February 2008 the NG-EADS team was 
awarded the contract for the new tanker, on July 9, 2008 the Pentagon announced the re-




THALES is a French company which began in 1893, when the Compagnie 
Francaise Thomson Houston (CFTH) was established. In 1968, Thomson-Brandt (the 
renamed CFTH) merged its electronic arm with Compagnie de Telegraphie Sans Fil 
creating Thomson-CSF. In June 2001 Thomson-CSF formed a joint venture with 
Raytheon and formed the Thales Raytheon Systems, with the parent companies owning 
fifty percent of the new firm. The company focuses its business on electronics, 
information systems and services, aerospace and security (THALES Group, 2008). 
The new firm won in 2003 the design competition for the Royal Navy 
Future Carrier; the company will participate in building the ship together with BAE 
Systems. In 2006 Thales acquired a major Australian military manufacturer, the 
Australian Defense Industries and the Bushmaster IMV. 
d. Finmeccanica 
Finmeccanica is an Italian conglomerate. The company’s main businesses 
focus on aeronautics, helicopters, space, defense electronics, information technology, and 
energy and transportation. The company’s history starts in 1948. In 1992 Augusta, the 
company’s subsidiary, participated as a partner in NMIndustries, which is the prime 
manufacturer of the NH90 helicopter. In July 2000, Augusta merged with the British 
GKN-Westland Helicopters and formed the Augusta Westland. In December 2001 a joint 
venture of Finmeccanica/BAE Systems named Alenia Marconi Systems (AMS) merged 
with other European missile contractors and formed MBDA, the second largest missile 
manufacturer in the world. In March 2007 Finmeccanica acquired from BAE Systems a 
25% share of SELEX Sensors and Airborne Systems. In October 2008 the company 
bought the U.S. defense company DRS Technologies. 
3. Current Situation 
In 2006, global arms production increased by 9% in nominal terms, amounting to 
$315 billion. Among the Top 100 firms, 41 U.S.-based companies accounted for 63% of 
the combined arms sales, while 34 West European companies accounted for 29%. The 
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biggest increases in arms sales were achieved by companies specializing in armored 
vehicles due to the U.S. demand arising from the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, and in 
other expanding sectors like communications and high technology electronics (SIPRI, 
2009). Tables 3 and 4 present the worlds and European major defense firms. 
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% of Revenue 
from Defense
1 Lockheed Martin  U.S. 1 $38,513.00 $36,090.00 $41,862.00 92.00% 
2 Boeing  U.S. 2 32,080.00 32,439.00 66,387.00 48 
3 BAE Systems  U.K. 3 29,800.00 25,070.60 31,400.00 95 
4 Northrop Grumman  U.S. 4 24,597.00 23,649.00 32,018.00 77 
5 General Dynamics  U.S. 6 21,520.00 18,769.00 27,240.00 79 
6 Raytheon 1  U.S. 5 19,800.00 19,500.00 21,300.00 93 
7 EADS  Netherlands 7 12,239.20 13,202.70 57,600.00 21.3 
8 L-3 Communications  U.S. 8 11,239.70 9,989.60 13,960.50 81 
9 Finmeccanica  Italy 9 10,601.60 9,057.10 19,778.90 53.6 
10 United Technologies  U.S. 10 8,761.40 7,652.60 54,759.00 16 
Source: www.defensenews.com  
Table 3.   World’s major defense firms (After Defense News Research) 









% of Revenue 
from Defense
1 BAE Systems  U.K. 29,800.00 25,070.60 31,400.00 95 
2 EADS  Netherlands 12,239.20 13,202.70 57,600.00 21.3 
3 Finmeccanica  Italy 10,601.60 9,057.10 19,778.90 53.6 
4 Thales  France 7,246.40 6,997.40 18,116.10 40 
5 Rolls-Royce  UK 4,392.60 4,062.30 14,840.00 29.6 
Source: www.defensenews.com  
Table 4.   Five European defense firms (After Defense News Research) 
B. MERGERS  
1. Introduction 
Mergers and acquisitions have been a quite popular strategy in the corporate 
world. North America led the way with five major merger waves through the last century. 
Europe, Asia and Latin America followed aggressively only after the fifth merger wave 
(Carbonara, 2008).  
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2. Terms and Definitions 
Throughout this thesis, the terms Merger, Acquisition and Consolidation are 
widely used. Their definitions provide useful information for the reader, since the terms 
are often confused or used interchangeably. A technical definition of the terms is the 
following: 
Merger is a combination of two or more companies in which the assets and 
liabilities of the selling firm(s) are absorbed by the buying firm. Although the buying 
firm may be a considerably different organization after the merger, it retains its original 
identity (Sherman & Hart, 2006).  There are four broad types of mergers: 
• The horizontal merger is when the involved firms belong in the same line 
of business. An example of horizontal merger is AT&T’s acquisition of 
Bell South. 
• The vertical merger involves firms at different stages of production but in 
the same supply chain. An illustrative case of vertical merger is eBay’s 
acquisition of PayPal. The customers use PayPal’s secure payment system 
to purchase goods from eBay. 
• The circular merger is the type of merger that involves companies with 
different products but similar distribution channels. A circular merger 
example is the Foster’s Group of Australia, a large Australian brewer that 
purchased Beringer’s Wine Estates of California in order to penetrate the 
U.S. market through Beringer’s existing distribution channel (Roberto, 
2005).  
• The conglomerate merger involves companies with few similarities in 
production or marketing, but who seek to create a bigger economic base 
and greater profits. Most of the mergers of the 1960s and 1970s were 
conglomerate mergers and are less popular in developed economies. A 
recent example is the acquisition of Time Warner by AOL, with the goal 
of creating a comprehensive package of media and information products 
for the customers of both companies.  
Acquisition is the purchase of an asset such as a plant, a division, or even an entire 
company (Sherman & Hart, 2006). A recent example is the acquisition of Gillette 
Company by Procter & Gamble which allowed that conglomerate to extend its reach in 
the market.  Finally, consolidation is the combination of separate companies or product 
lines, into a single one. Consolidation differs from a merger, in that a new entity is 
created (BNET, 2009). 
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3. Motives of Mergers 
The following are the principal motives that drive corporate mergers (Breadley, 
Myers, & Allen, 2008): 
a. Economies of Scale 
Many mergers seek to reduce the cost of the merged companies and so 
achieve economies of scale. It is anticipated that the merger will lead to shared services 
and technology, or a reduction in the overall staff. Economies of scale are the natural goal 
of horizontal mergers. The architects of these mergers look to consolidate central services 
such as management, financial control, executive development and top-level 
management.  
b. Economies of Vertical Integration 
In a vertical merger, the companies merge either with a supplier or with a 
customer in order to achieve better coordination and administration. By merging, they 
gain better control of the production process by expanding toward the output of the raw 
material or forward toward the end user. 
c. Complementary Resources 
Complementary resources are a strong motive for two companies to 
merge. In cases where a company specializes in a product or service and lacks the means 
or talent to promote it in the market, it may find a solution through another company that 
specializes in this area. The merger opens up opportunities for both companies that 
neither firm could achieve otherwise. 
d.  Surplus Funds 
Surplus cash or funds lead companies to mergers financed by cash as a 
way to redeploy their capital. This way the company expands itself and creates viable 
investments for its shareholders. 
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e. Eliminating Inefficiencies 
There are mergers that seek to eliminate the inefficiencies of a company, 
which the management is reluctant to face either due to lack of determination or fear that 
the changes will affect the management itself in an unfortunate way. Such inefficiencies 
may be excess personnel or unnecessary expenses that have to be reduced and lead to the 
company’s bad performance. After a merger the new, more determined management can 
easily take the painful measures that could eliminate the existing inefficiencies.     
f. Industry Consolidation 
In situations where there are too many firms and too much capacity in an 
industry, consolidation leads to a cut in capacity, reduction of cost and release of capital 
that can be reinvested elsewhere in the economy. A relevant example is the creation of 
EADS from the merger of the Daimler Chrysler Aerospace AG (DASA) of Germany, 
Aerospatiale-Matra of France and Construcciones Aeronauticas SA (CASA) of Spain. 
4. History of Mergers and Merger Waves 
According to economists, merger and acquisition (M&A) specialists and 
historians, five major merger waves have been observed in the history of mergers and 
acquisitions, especially in the United States of America (Gaughan, 2007).  
The first merger wave lasted from 1893 to 1904. This wave was characterized by 
the great numbers of horizontal mergers and focused on the industries of steel, telephone, 
oil, mining, and railroads that formed famous industrial giants of the era.  
The second merger wave began in 1919 and lasted until 1929. This merger wave was 
characterized by vertical consolidations such as the formation of major automobile 
manufacturers. The wave was ended due to the economic crash of 1929 and the Great 
Depression.  
The third merger wave started in 1955 and ended in 1969-73. During this wave 




Jimmy Ling), Teledyne (led by Henry Singleton) and Litton (led by Tex Thornton). The oil 
crisis of 1973 and the worldwide weakening economy led to the end of the third merger 
wave.  
The fourth merger wave lasted from 1984 to 1989 and was characterized as the 
takeover wave and by the size and prominence of the acquired companies. In Europe cross-
border horizontal mergers emerged in order to prepare the companies for the new demands of 
the Common Market, while in the U.S. corporate raiders fought for the acquisition of several 
companies. The fourth merger wave ended in 1989 due to the end of the economic expansion, 
the collapse of the junk bond market, the collapse of the savings and loan banks and the 
serious problems of the commercial banks.  
The fifth merger wave started in 1992 and ended in 2000. It was characterized as the 
era of the mega deal since companies of unprecedented size and global sweep were formed. 
Some examples are the mergers of Citibank and Travelers, Chrysler and Daimler Benz, 
Exxon and Mobil, Boeing and McDonnell Douglas, AOL and Time Warner, and Vodafone 
and Mannesmann. In 2000 the amount of money spent on mergers reached the $3.3 trillion. 
Another major merger sector was telecommunications media and technology (TMT), which 
experienced a five-year boom and then a dramatic slowdown with the bursting of the Internet 
bubble in March 2000, which led to the end of the fifth merger wave.   
5. Mergers and Acquisitions in the European and Transatlantic Defense 
Market 
During the 1980s, the European defense industry was fragmented. Too many 
small firms specialized in certain kinds of weapons. They were mainly dependent on their 
government for business and in many cases they were owned by these governments.  
Meanwhile, the U.S. defense industry was consolidating at a fast pace. In the late 80s and 
early 90s consolidations took the form of large defense national champions like 
Germany’s Daimler-Benz acquiring small domestic firms1 or large companies acquiring 
minor target defense industries in other E.U. countries (one example is the French firm 
Thomson-CSF acquiring the defense electronics division of The Dutch firm Philips and 
the UK based Pilkington electronics) (Guay & Callum, 2002). 
                                                 
1 Daimler-Benz acquired AEG, Dornier Aerospace, Krauss-Maffei and Messerschmidt. 
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It was difficult for a foreign company to acquire a domestic one. The national 
firms tried to maintain their independence through joint ventures (for products like 
missiles) or multinational consortia (Eurofighter jet).  
In the late 1990s European defense firms, under political and economic pressure, 
started to consolidate. This second and more important wave of mergers and 
multinational collaborative programs were supported by governments with significant 
defense industry for many reasons, such as (Darnis et al., 2007): 
• These programs guarantee large orders and thus economies of scale. That 
means cost savings. Finally, the states can meet a required capability at a 
lower and affordable price. Table 5 shows the inefficiencies of the 
European defense industry due to the duplication of procurement 
programs—some 89 programs compared to 27 U.S., on much lower 
defense budgets. 
• E.U. member states are co-operating in common military operations 
around the world. They need common equipment in order to achieve 
interoperability. This was an important lesson learned during operations in 
the former Yugoslavia. 
• International security is one of the most important concerns of the E.U. 
Member states have to gain political benefits if they actively engage in the 
process of building a common European strategic culture. 
• Strong European defense companies and multinational collaborative 
programs ensure the security of the supply and maintenance of the 
European defense industrial and technology base. 
• There are some significant positive side effects, such as common 
standards and specifications, technology sharing and development, 
integrated logistics and successful exports. 
 
System Europe USA 
Land systems   
-Main battle tanks 4 1 
-Armored fighting vehicles 16 3 
-155 mm Howitzer 3 1 
Air systems   
-Fighter-strike 7 5 
-Ground attack trainer 6 1 
-Attack helicopter 7 5 
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System Europe USA 
-Anti-ship missiles 9 3 
-Air-to-air missiles 8 4 
Naval systems   
-Main surface combatant ship 11 2 
-Diesel submarine 7 0 
-Anti-submarine torpedo 9 2 
-Nuclear submarine 2 1 
Total 89 27 
Source: European Commission, UNISYS, Final report of the study: Evaluation of the common 
Initiative in the context of the Intra-EU Transfers of Defense Goods, Brussels, February 2005. 
Table 5.   Defense Programs in Europe and U.S. (From Darnis et al, 2007) 
In January 1999, BAE Systems was created after the acquisition of Marconi 
Electronic Systems (defense sector of GEC) by British Aerospace for more than ₤7.7 
billion. Although British Aerospace was negotiating a (horizontal) merger with Daimler 
Chrysler Aerospace AG (DASA- aerospace unit of Germany’s Daimler-Chrysler), it 
finally proceeded to a vertical integration with Marconi. After this acquisition British 
Aerospace was transformed from a military aerospace platform builder to a systems 
manufacturer with increased capabilities in defense electronics (Schmitt, 2000).  In 
response to this merger, EADS (European Aeronautic Defense and Space Company) was 
also formed in 1999. This European structure came from the mergers of France’s 
Aerospatiale and Matra with DASA and Spain’s CASA (Neal & Taylor, 2001). This 
transnational European giant was able to challenge U.S. firms like Boeing and Lockheed 
Martin and could produce a wide variety of defense products such as the Eurofighter 
combat aircraft, A400M transport aircraft, Eurocopter and other strategic weapons 
(Jones, 2006). 
Similar consolidations took place in other defense sectors. Thomson-CSF 
acquired Racal Electronics (UK) in June 2000 to create Thales. In 2001 AgustaWestland 
was formed after the merger of Italy’s Agusta (owned by Finmeccanica) and the UK’s 
Westland. It is the world’s second largest helicopter producer after Boeing. Finally, in  
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2001 came the formation of MBDA, the world’s second larger missile producer (behind 
Raytheon), after the merger of the missile sectors of BAE Systems, EADS and 
Finmeccanica (Vlachos-Dengler, 2002). 
As a result of these developments, the European defense market is dominated by 
the giants of BAE Systems and EADS, followed by Finmeccanica and Thales. It is 
possible to identify two different consolidation strategies. BAE Systems was formed after 
the consolidation of many smaller UK firms, but EADS was the result of many 
transnational mergers within similar sectors of the defense industry. 
After 2000, the European firms tried to increase their ‘’footprint’’ in the U.S. 
market through the acquisitions of minor U.S. firms. Between 2001 and 2005 European 
companies acquired 67 U.S. companies for more than seven billion Euros (Aalto et al., 
2008). BAE Systems is a classical example. Its U.S. subsidiary is the sixth largest U.S. 
defense company; in FY2007 BAE earned 44.3% of its revenues from this subsidiary. In 
fact, BAE does more business with DoD than with the British Ministry of Defense. BAE 
has consolidated its presence in this area with the $4 billion strategic acquisition of the 
U.S. company Armor Holdings (maker of Humvees) in 2007. BAE Systems is taking 
advantage of the U.S.-UK treaty signed in June 2007. This treaty is lifting the barriers 
imposed by U.S. security concerns and making it easier for British firms to penetrate the 
U.S. market. Additionally, EADS has manufacturing sites in Texas, Mississippi and 
Alabama making helicopters for the U.S. law enforcement agencies. 
The recent developments in the mergers and acquisition field include major naval 
consolidation deals in France and the UK, actively encouraged by the respective 
governments. The French state-owned shipbuilder Direction des Constructions Navales 
(DCN) took over the naval operations of Thales in a deal worth $714 million, while in the 
UK BAE Systems and Vosper Thornycroft (VT) Group agreed on a joint venture 
combining their surface shipbuilding and service operations.  
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C. EUROPEAN DEFENSE POLICY 
1. Introduction 
The European Union took several measures to improve its defense capabilities 
and to strengthen the position of its defense industry in the global market. Several 
organizations and associations were formed, either from the states’ side or from the 
defense industries’ side, to support their interests. Also, various agreements and laws 
were established to reinforce E.U. policy. It is quite interesting to examine this 
framework since it could justify the reasons that either led to or forced the formation of 
the contemporary European defense industry, through consolidations, mergers and 
acquisitions. 
2. Legislation 
Article 296 of the European Treaty allows members to protect their domestic 
defense industry for national security, strategic, economic and supply security reasons. 
However, in 2006 the states agreed to create a genuine European defense market where 
the states can purchase according to the best offer without being obliged to contract with 
the national suppliers (Hartley, 2008). 
In July 2000, an agreement concerning the Measures to Facilitate the 
Restructuring and Operation of the European Defense Industry was signed by Britain, 
France, Germany, Italy and Spain for cooperation on defense industrial issues 
(Mawdsley, 2003). The key areas of the agreement cover: 
• Security and Supply: The agreement states that the nations must not hinder 
the supply of defense materials to the other participants and must consult 
on any consolidation in defense industry that may threaten their security of 
supply. 
• Exports Procedures: The nations commit to simplifying the procedures for 
transfers among themselves and developing lists of permitted destinations 
to export military products that were produced jointly. 
• Security of Classified Information: It focuses and enhances the exchange 
of classified defense industry information among the nations. 
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• Treatment of Technical Information: The nations are obliged to harmonize 
the contracting procedures to accommodate the reforming and operation of 
their defense industries. 
• Research and Technology: The agreement focuses on the coordination of 
the joint R&D activities. 
• Harmonization of Military Requirements: It emphasizes early planning 
and programming for military projects.    
The United States established the “Declaration of Principles on defense 
equipment and industrial cooperation,” which they endorsed through bilateral 
negotiations with some of the nations of the above agreement. The agreement intended to 
create cooperation on security of supply, Research and Development, exports, market 
access, handling of classified information and military requirements. This declaration 
favored both parties since every state’s industry would be treated equally to those of the 
other states in terms of procurement.  
3. European Organizations 
a. The Western European Armaments Group (WEAG) 
The WEAG was formed in Rome in May 1993. Armament cooperation is 
based on some basic principles, the most important of which are (Western European 
Union, n.d.): 
• All 13 nations should be entitled to participate fully, and with the 
same rights and responsibilities, in any European armaments 
cooperation forum.  
• There should be a single European armaments cooperation forum.  
• Armaments cooperation in Europe should be managed by the 
National Armaments Directors of all the 13 nations, who will be 
accountable to the Ministers of Defense of those governments.  
• The existing links with NATO and the European Defence 
Industries Group (EDIG) should be maintained. 
• WEAG has the following objectives: 
• Efficient use of resources through, inter alia, increased 
harmonization of requirements. 
• The opening up of national defense markets to cross-border 
competition. 
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• Strong European defense technological and industrial base. 
• Cooperation in research and development. 
b. The European Defence Agency (EDA) 
The EDA was established in July 2004 from the European Council of 
Ministers of Defense as an organization to improve the European defense capabilities in 
crisis management, promote research and development, promote armaments cooperation, 
strengthen the technological and industrial base and create a competitive European 
Defense Market. The Agency has developed relations with the respective elements of 
other European defense organizations such as the Organisation Conjointe de Coopération 
en matière d'Armement (OCCAR). After the closing of WEAG, the Agency took over a 
part of its work (European Defence Agency, 2009). 
c. The Aero Space and Defence Industries Association of Europe 
(ASD)  
The ASD was formed from European aeronautics, space, defense and 
security industries to promote and support the competitive development of the sector.  To 
understand the magnitude of the association, ASD has 30 member associations in 20 
countries across Europe and represents 2,000 companies and 80,000 suppliers. Also, its 
companies employ around 634,600 employees. In 2007 the industry did €132.2 billion in 
business (Aero Space and Defence Industries Association of Europe, 2005).  
d.  The Organisation Conjointe de Coopération en matière 
d'Armement (OCCAR) 
The OCCAR was established in 1996 by the Defense Ministers of France, 
Germany, Italy and the U.K. as a treaty to provide effective and efficient management to 
collaborative armament programs (Organisation for Joint Armament Cooperation, n.d.). 
In contradiction to the WEAG, the OCCAR seeks progress through a narrower band of 
partners. In 2001 OCCAR became a legal entity, with the authority to sign contracts with 
industry on behalf of its members. Belgium and Spain became members of OCCAR in 
2003 and 2005, respectively. In addition, the Netherlands, Luxemburg and Turkey 
participate in the treaty as observers.  It is worth mentioning that the four charter member 
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states account for two-thirds of European defense production.  Some of the projects 
managed by OCCAR are the Counter Battery Radar (COBRA), A400M, Future Surface 
to Air Missiles Family (FSAF), Multi-Role Armored Vehicle (GTK/MRAV/PWV), 
HOT/MILAN Anti-Tank Weapon Systems and the TIGER and Helicopter programs 
(Kenny, 2006). 
4. European and World’s Defense Spending 
This section provides information and background data and analysis of the 
economies and defense spending of 15 E.U. countries.2 The data show that there are great 
differences among the 15 states in terms of military expenditures and economic 
situations, as shown in Table 6.  
                                                 
2 The section’s data are for  the ‘core’ 15 E.U. countries (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the UK) and 
does not look at the 12 new members that joined the E.U. either in 2004 (Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia) or in 2007 (Bulgaria, Romania). 
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 In constant 
( 2005 ) U.S.$ bn. 
as % of GDP 
Austria 3.1 0.8 
Belgium  4.3 1.1 
Denmark 3.6 1.4 
Finland 2.6 1.4 
France 53.5 2.4 
Germany  36 1.3 
Greece 9.3 3.8 
Ireland 1.2 0.5 
Italy 33 1.8 
Luxembourg  0.3 0.8 
The Netherlands 9.8 1.5 
Portugal 3.3 1.9 
Spain 14.6 1.2 
Sweden 5.2 1.5 
UK 59.7 2.6 
E.U. 15 (average) 15.9 1.6 
E.U. 15  total 239.5  
U.S.  711 4 
Source: SIPRI 2008 Yearbook 
Table 6.   Defense spending in E.U. (After SIPRI) 
Each country’s economic situation plays an important role in defense spending, 
but there are also other political and strategic factors that affect affordability. 
The following major categories of countries can be identified: 
• Economically weak countries that spend a lot (Greece, Portugal) 
• Wealthy countries that spend a lot (UK, France, Germany, Sweden, The 
Netherlands and Italy)  
• Wealthy countries that are low spenders (Luxemburg, Austria, Denmark, 
and Belgium) 
The end of the Cold War and the 1990s saw a rapid decline in defense spending 
and procurement purchases, especially for those E.U. countries that were large 
contributors to the total E.U. defense spending, as shown in Table 7. On the other hand, 
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defense spending began showing a positive trend just after the 2001 terrorist attacks, but 
has remained relative static over the last years, as depicted in Figure 1. 
 
 1991 2000 % Difference 
UK 62.3 47.7 -23.4 
GERMANY 55 41.1 -25.2 
FRANCE 57.7 50 -13.3 
Source: SIPRI various Yearbooks 




Figure 1.   World Military Expenditure 1988-2007 (From SIPRI, 2008) 
Other important facts concerning European and world defense spending are: 
• U.S. military spending accounts for 45% of the world’s 2007 total, 
followed by the UK, China, France and Japan, with 4–5% each. 
• U.S. military spending has increased by 59% in real terms since 2001. 
• The E.U.’s 15 core states’ spending accounts for less than 40% of U.S. 
spending. 
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• The E.U. budgets have halved over the last 20 years, from 3.5% of GDP to 
an average of 1.6%. 
• World military expenditures for 2007 are estimated at $1339 billion. That 





A. EVENT STUDIES 
1. Introduction 
Event studies are an important, and the predominant, methodological approach to 
market based empirical research in the areas of finance and accounting. This 
methodology was first introduced in the late 1960s in the studies of Ray Ball and Philip 
Brown (1968) and Eugene Fama et al. (1969), who tried to determine the effects of 
specific information, like earnings announcements and stock splits in firms’ security 
prices.  
Since then, event studies, also known as residual analysis and abnormal 
performance index tests (Bowman, 1983), have been used in numerous studies in order to 
analyze the security price behavior around the time of an information announcement, 
called an event. Event studies have been applied to study a variety of firm-specific and 
economy-wide events like the announcement of annual accounting earnings, mergers and 
acquisitions, accounting principle changes, issues of new debt or equity and changes in 
macro-economic factors or the regulatory environment.  
In conclusion, an event study is an analysis using financial market data, to 
determine if there is a statistically significant reaction to a particular event that is 
assumed to have an impact on the market value of a public firm. A. Craig MacKinlay, 
author of the study ‘’Event Studies in Economics and Finance,’’ claims that such studies 
are useful, taking into consideration that: 
…given rationality in the market place, the effects of an event will be 
reflected immediately in security prices. Thus a measure of an event’s 
economic impact can be constructed using security prices observed over a 
relatively short period of time. (1997, March, p.13) 
In this report the authors use statistical inference to determine if there was a 
statistically significant reaction in the stock price of the four major European aerospace 
and defense firms to the announcement of a merger or acquisition.  
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2. Event Study Structure 
In the years since the first seminal event studies, certain modifications have been 
developed in order to deal with complications with statistical assumptions used in the 
early work and to accommodate more specific hypotheses. Although the event study 
literature is diverse because of the range of topics covered and the available techniques, 
the structure of the event studies is rather simple and straightforward. In other words, 
while the structure is not unique, there is a common general flow of analysis. 
The first step in conducting the event study is to identify the event of interest and 
to determine the time period over which the security prices of the firm involved will be 
examined. This is the event window. In this report the event window is defined as the 
announcement date of a merger/acquisition plus one trading day after the announcement.  
It is common to set the event window as larger than the specific event because the effects 
may be obvious days after the release of the information. The precise identification of the 
event date is crucial for the power of the tests (Brown and Warner, 1985). The 
researchers collected announcement dates and target firms for each one of the four 
contractors (BAE, EADS, Finmecanicca, and Thales) and then verified these dates with 
the respective corporate press releases found on the corporate websites.   
At this point it is essential to mention that the researchers decided to use the daily 
arithmetic stock and index returns methodology instead of several other options like 
monthly or quarterly returns. The daily arithmetic stock and index returns are the 
percentage change from day to day. The use of daily stock price data is supported in the 
event studies literature (Brown & Warner, 1985; MacKinlay, 1997) as most appropriate, 
given the frequency of the consolidation announcements.  
The next and most important step is the measurement of the abnormal return. 
The abnormal return is defined as the difference between the actual (or realized) ex post 
security return over the event window and the normal (or expected) return of the firm’s 
security over the event window. The normal return can be defined as the security return if 
the event had not taken place. Thus, for firm i and event date t, the abnormal return is: 
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ARit = Rit – ERit 
where ARit , Rit  and ERit  are the abnormal, actual and normal returns, 
respectively. 
There are many estimation models available for determining the abnormal returns. 
One of the most popular is the market model, which assumes a stable linear relation 
between the security return and the market portfolio index return. 
Using the market model to calculate the normal return, the abnormal return is: 
ARit = Rit – (ai + βi Rmt) 
where, Rmt  is the market portfolio index return and ai , bi are constants 
(coefficients)  for security i , calculated from the estimation window returns.  These 
constants can either be calculated using the appropriate formulae or can be directly 
derived from the MS Excel Data Analysis regression tool. 
In this report, the estimation window is defined as the timeframe of 120 days prior 
to the event but not including the announcement date. The event date was not included in 
the estimation window in order not to influence the normal performance estimates 
(Bowman, 1983; McKinlay, 1997).  Otherwise the event impact would be captured by 
both the normal and abnormal returns, violating the main assumption that the event 
impact is captured by the abnormal returns only. 
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Where μi , μm are the mean values of the stock and index return, respectively, 
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The following example is provided in order to illustrate the methodology of 
calculating the abnormal return based on the daily arithmetic returns and the market 
model. 
On January 30, 2003, EADS announced the acquisition of the 25% stake of 
ASTRIUM from BAE Systems. The first step is to calculate the daily arithmetic returns 
for both the stock price of EADS and the EURONEXT 100 index for the 120 days 
preceding the announcement, the announcement day and the day after. Next, the daily 
arithmetic stock returns are regressed against the daily arithmetic index returns using the 
MS Excel Data Analysis regression tool for the period of 120 days prior to the 
announcement but not the announcement date itself—thus the estimation window.  








X Variable 1 1.0325034 0.12471144 8.279139556 2.19E-13 
 
Table 8.   EADS and EURONEXT 100 (Market index) Regression Data 
According to the market model, the normal (predicted) EADS stock return for the 
announcement date is calculated such that: 
EADS normal (predicted) return = 
Intercept + X Variable * (Actual index return on date of announcement)   
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The coefficient values are substituted from Table 8 and the normal EADS stock 
return is calculated: 
ADS normal (predicted) return = -0.00255888 +1.0325034 *(0.025726) = 
0.024003 
where 0.025726 is the previously calculated actual index arithmetic return on the 
date of the announcement.  
The next step is to calculate the abnormal return in order to determine the effect 
of the released information. The abnormal return is the difference between the actual 
stock return on the announcement date and the previously calculated normal or expected 
return.   
Table 9 illustrates the values of the calculated stock and index returns. 
 
DATE STOCK PRICE DAILY STOCK 
RETURN 
INDEX PRICE DAILY INDEX 
RETURN 
1/30/2003 9.88 0.04 510.35 0.025726 
1/31/2003 9.7 0.01822 513.75 0.006662 
 
Table 9.   EADS stock and Market Index Daily Returns 
According to the methodology, the abnormal return for the EADS stock on the 
announcement day is calculated as: 
Abnormal return = Actual stock return – Normal (predicted) return. 
The substitution results in: 
Abnormal return = 0.04 - 0.024003 = 0.015997. 
The same procedure is followed in order to calculate the abnormal return for the 
day after the announcement. 
The final step of the procedure is to calculate the appropriate t-statistic, which 
functions as a measure to determine if the calculated abnormal returns were statistically 
significant. To do so, the abnormal return is divided by the standard error of the 
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regression analysis. This standard error can either be calculated or derived directly from 









Table 10.   EADS and EURONEXT 100 (Market index) Regression Statistics 













 , where n=120, the number of days in the estimation 
window. 
The example is completed by calculating the t-statistic for January 30, 2003, 
dividing the abnormal return (0.015997) by the standard error of Table 10 (0.03105359), 
resulting in a t-statistic value of 0.51513 (rounded). 
B. METHOD OF ANALYSIS 
1. Hypothesis Testing 
The analysis of the data for the event studies requires the implementation of a 
statistical hypothesis testing, which is a common method of making decisions based on 
experimental data. The testing procedure begins with the assumption that the null 
hypothesis, denoted as H0, is true. Then, using the previous calculated test statistic (as 
outlined previously in Section A) and a decision rule, an assessment is made whether the 
null or the alternative hypothesis, denoted as H1, is supported by the data. In statistical 
hypothesis testing the basic question to be answered is what, assuming the null 
hypothesis is true, is the probability of observing a value for the test statistic as extreme 
as the value that was actually observed? 
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In these event studies. the null hypothesis H0 is defined as the consolidation 
announcement having no effect on the abnormal return of a given stock price. That means 
that the abnormal return is equal to zero. The alternative hypothesis, H1, is defined as the 
consolidation announcement having an effect on the abnormal return of a given stock 
price, thus the abnormal return is not equal to zero. 
In these event studies both positive and negative abnormal returns can be 
observed, so a two-tailed hypothesis test is used; the mathematical representation of the 
hypotheses is as follows: 
Ho: ARit = 0, where ARit represents the abnormal return. 
H1: ARit ≠ 0, where ARit represents the abnormal return. 
C. DETERMINATION OF STATISTICAL SIGNIFICANCE 
Since the abnormal returns calculated for a specific date are not equal to zero, it is 
essential to determine whether or not there is sufficient evidence to infer statistical 
significance in the finding. For this purpose the Student’s t-distribution or simply t-
distribution is used as shown in Figure 2. It is often used as an alternative to the normal 
distribution, and the overall shape of its probability density function resembles the bell 
shape of a normally distributed variable with mean 0 and variance 1, although it is 
described more as mound shaped than bell shaped. The basic parameter of the t-
distribution is the degrees of freedom, denoted with the Greek letter ν.  As the number of 
degrees of freedom grows, the t-distribution approaches the normal distribution with 






Figure 2.   Student’s T-distribution Probability Density Function with different ν 
 
In order to determine whether or not there is sufficient evidence to infer statistical 
significance in the finding, the previously calculated t-statistic is compared to the Critical 
values of t-distribution. The tables of Critical values of t-distribution can be obtained 




t.200 t.100 t.050 t.002 t.001 
120 1.289 1.658 1.980 2.358 2.617 
 
Table 11.   Critical Values of t for two-tailed test (After: Statistics for Management 
and Economics, Seventh Edition, Appendix B-9 (Keller, 2005)) 
In this report, the degrees of freedom used are defined as the number of 
observations, n, minus the number of regressors in the sample. The number of 
observations, n, represents the number of the 120 trading days used in the regression 
analysis. The degrees of freedom used to determine the critical t values is 120, since there 
is one regressor and that is the closest value of degrees of freedom in the table that 
matches the actual degrees of freedom from the event studies.  
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In hypothesis testing it is possible to commit two errors: 
A Type I error occurs when the researchers reject a true null hypothesis:  
P (Type I error) =α. 
A Type II error occurs when the researcher fails to reject a false null hypothesis: 
P (Type II error) =β. 
The probability of committing a type I error (α) is the significance level of the 
test. 
The probability of not committing a type I error (1-α) is the confidence level of 
the test.   
The probability of not committing a type II error (1-β) is the power of the test. 
The determination of the significance level of the abnormal returns is based on t-
statistic value thresholds, which correspond to the critical values of t and are listed below 


























Table 12.    t-statistic Value Thresholds 
For example, if the calculated t-statistic value is lower than the critical value of t 
at 1.289, then the null hypothesis (the abnormal return actually equals zero) is accepted, 
since the finding is not statistically significant. If the calculated t-statistic is between the 
critical values for t of 1.289 and 1.658, then the finding is significant at the 10%-20% 
level but the statistical inference is of weak significance. The rejection areas according to 
the level of statistical significance (α) are represented in Figure 3.   
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Figure 3.   Rejection regions for 20% statistical significance (α= 0.2) 
In conclusion, the stronger the statistical significance (smaller α value), the 
smaller the probability of committing a Type I error, rejecting a true null hypothesis. 
  0 
1.555 









IV. DATA ANALYSIS 
A. DATA ANALYSIS INTRODUCTION 
A total of 80 event studies were executed for the top four European Defense 
Companies. In some cases, event studies were executed for the same company in 
different stock markets, in order to examine the reaction of different stock markets to the 
same announcement. In particular, the event studies for EADS and Thales were executed 
for both the “CAC 40” and “EURONEXT 100” stock markets.  
The results are presented in Tables 13 through 18. Each table can be interpreted as 
follows: all the events are presented in chronological order from the oldest to the newest.  
The first column presents the announcement date, the second the target company that was 
acquired or merged with the examined company, the third the “t-stat” of the analysis for 
the announcement date, the fourth the statistical significance of the “t-stat” for the 
announcement date, the fifth the “t-stat” of the following date of the announcement and 
the sixth the statistical significance of the “t-stat” of the following date of the 
announcement. Only the announcements that experienced statistically significant results 
are presented; this case study set the threshold at the 20% significant level. The 
significant results of the consolidations are presented in dark characters, while the rest are 
not presented at all for easier presentation. 
1. BAE Systems 
Twenty-one announcements were examined for BAE Systems for the period 
between 2001 and 2009 and an event study executed for each.  Table 13 presents in detail 
the results concerning the arithmetic return events for each announcement of the 
company. Fourteen out of the 21 announcements, or 67%, presented statistically 
significant abnormal returns, while 33% did not present any statistically significant 
abnormal returns. Eight of these announcements (57%) resulted in positive significant 
abnormal returns, while six of these announcements (43%) resulted in negative 
significant abnormal returns. Thus, 38% of the announcements resulted in positive 




Target t-stat Stat Signif. t-stat Stat Signif. 
10/22/2002 Condor Pacific Industries -0.9515   -1.1384   
2/5/2003 MEVATEC Corp -0.3059   0.4575   
2/17/2003 Advanced Power Technologies Inc 0.7401   -0.6760   
8/22/2003 29% of ALVIS  0.7705   0.1218   
4/5/2004 STI Industries Inc 0.4479   -0.5719   
6/3/2004 ALVIS PLC 24.6044 >1% 24.6026 >1% 
7/1/2004 BOEING Commercial Electronics Unit 0.0042   -0.6639   
7/8/2004 Practical Imagineering Inc -0.6540   -0.2813   
9/2/2004 Digital Net -9.7349 >1% -9.7354 >1% 
9/28/2004 ALFATECH 9.0625 >1% 10.2687 >1% 
3/7/2005 United Defense Industries -2.5504 1%-5% 0.3454   
9/7/2006 National Sensor Systems LLC 4.9605 >1% 6.5602 >1% 
5/8/2007 Armor Holdings Inc 24.3954 >1% 24.3966 >1% 
11/28/2007 Pitch Technologies AB 5.0540 >1% 2.6561 >1% 
12/24/2007 MTC Technologies -5.5990 >1% -5.5992 >1% 
1/3/2008 Petards LTD 5.9278 >1% 3.1945 >1% 
1/18/2008 Tenix Defense 5.3251 >1% 5.3240 >1% 
4/16/2008 IST Dynamics -1.6351 10-20%  -1.4639   
7/28/2008 Detica Group PLC -12.434 >1% -12.434 >1% 
12/22/2008 Tenix Toll Defense Logistics 5.0780 >1% 5.0826 >1% 
3/12/2009 Advanced Ceramics Research -6.1796 >1% -6.1805 >1% 
 
Table 13.   BAE Systems Arithmetic Return Events: Statistical Significance  
These results indicate that BAE Systems’ announcements for consolidations or 
acquisitions of other companies affected the stock price return, usually for the better. So 
the market responded to the strategy of the company concerning consolidations, and in a 
more positive than negative manner.   
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2. EADS 
Twenty-one announcements were examined for EADS for the period between 
2001 and 2009 and 39 regressions were executed. Eighteen were examined for 
“EURONEXT 100” and 20 one for “CAC 40.” The difference in the number of examined 
announcements is due to the fact that the authors did not find accurate data concerning 
the same announcements in both of the stock markets.  
Tables 14 and 15 present in detail the results concerning the arithmetic return 
events for each announcement of the company in each stock market. Table 14 presents 
the results relative to the “EURONEXT 100” stock market and Table 15 present the 


















10/16/2001 PZL -0.3418  0.7887  
12/3/2001 COGENT 0.5566  -0.7200  
1/30/2003 ASTRIUM 0.5151  -0.7258  
11/20/2003 ASL Lemwerder -0.7184  1.3898  
10/6/2004 RACAL Instruments -1.0416  -0.5966  
12/1/2005 Dutch space -2.1142 1%-5% 0.0477  
12/30/2005 ATLAS ELECTRONICS 
-0.9828 
  -0.9633  
4/7/2006 GET -1.2563  -0.6423  
5/4/2006 IFR 0.3285  -0.0352  
5/9/2006 Sofrelog 1.0334  -0.3321  
6/9/2006 Dynamic 0.1355  0.8420  
10/13/2006 20% of Airbus -0.0629  0.1424  
11/5/2007 Mc ALPINE -2.6355 >1% -0.7737  
4/7/2008 SURREY -0.4454  0.0901  
4/22/2008 PLANT CML -0.0042  -1.6675 5%-10% 
5/28/2008 MOTORFLUG -0.0781  -0.9128  
7/8/2008 SPOT 0.3103  0.7839  
10/1/2008 IMASS 1.2383  1.5558 10%-20% 




















6/20/2001 Australian aerospace -0.9102  1.6832  5%-
10% 
6/27/2001 Finnish Patria -0.7111   -0.2790   
7/19/2001 BOSCH Satcom -0.7356   -0.2261   
10/16/2001 PZL -1.0788   0.3423   
12/3/2001 COGENT 0.4923   -0.8408   
1/30/2003 ASTRIUM 0.5648   -0.7610   
11/20/2003 ASL Lemwerder -0.6538   0.9982   
10/6/2004 RACAL Instruments -0.9458   -0.5167   
12/1/2005 Dutch space -1.9060  5%-10% 0.2522   
12/30/2005 ATLAS 
ELECTRONICS 
-0.9071   -0.9181   
4/7/2006 GET -0.0890   0.9455   
5/4/2006 IFR 0.3470   0.0737   
5/9/2006 Sofrelog 0.9140   -0.4806   
6/9/2006 Dynamic 0.7925   -0.8318   
10/13/2006 20% of Airbus -0.0284   0.1369   
11/5/2007 Mc ALPINE -2.7206   -0.8013   
4/7/2008 SURREY -0.4406   0.1000   
4/22/2008 PLANT CML -0.2376   -0.8513   
5/28/2008 MOTORFLUG -0.0206   -0.8927   
7/8/2008 SPOT -0.0388   -0.6414   
10/1/2008 IMASS 1.2959  10-20% 1.8012  5%-
10% 
 
Table 15.    EADS in “CAC 40” Arithmetic Return Events: Statistical Significance  
In total seven out of the 39 announcements of EADS or a percentage of 18% 
presented statistically significant abnormal returns. In particular three of these 
announcements or a percentage of 8% resulted positive significant abnormal returns, 
while four or a percentage of 10% resulted negative significant abnormal returns. The 
reaction of “EURONEXT 100” and “CAC 40” financial markets was as follows: 
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Four out of 18 announcements of EADS in the “EURONEXT 100,” or a 
percentage of 22%, presented statistically significant abnormal returns. Three of these 
announcements (75%) resulted in negative significant abnormal returns, while one 
announcement (25%) resulted in a positive significant abnormal return. Overall, these 
numbers represented a 17% rate of negative significant abnormal returns and a 5% rate of 
positive significant abnormal returns. 
The results were almost the same in the “CAC 40” stock market. Three out of 21 
announcements of EADS in the “CAC 40,” or 14%, presented statistically significant 
abnormal returns. Two of these announcements (67%) resulted in positive significant 
abnormal returns, while one (33%) resulted in negative significant abnormal returns. 
Overall, these numbers represent rates of nine-point-five percent positive significant 
abnormal returns and four-point-five % negative significant abnormal returns. 
Examining the results in total, in seven out of 39 event studies the markets 
responded to firm’s announcements by presenting statistically significant abnormal 
returns. Three of these announcements or 43%, resulted in positive significant abnormal 
returns, while four of these announcements, or 57%, resulted in negative significant 
abnormal returns. As part of the total number of announcements, there were eight % 
positive significant abnormal returns and ten % negative significant abnormal returns. 
Both of the stock markets responded to the firm’s consolidation in two out of four 
common announcements and did not respond at all to the other 14. Also, the common 
responses were made in the same manner, one negatively and one positively, but with 
different significance. So, the two financial markets responded in the same way in 16 out 
of 18 common announcements (i.e., 89% of the time). 
These results indicate that EADS’ announcements for consolidations or 
acquisitions of other companies had some effect on the stock price return in both the 
“EURONEXT 100” and “CAC 40” stock markets, 8% positively and ten % negatively in 
total. 
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So, it is evident that both markets responded almost identically to the strategy of 
the company concerning consolidations, with “EURONEXT 100” and “CAC 40” 
responding in the same way in sixteen out of eighteen common announcements. 
3. Thales 
Eight announcements were examined for Thales for the period between 2001 and 
2009 and 16 event studies were executed. Tables 16 and 17 present in detail the results 
concerning the arithmetic return events for each announcement. Table 16 presents the 
results relative to the “EURONEXT 100” stock market and Table 17 the results relative 
to the “CAC 40” stock market.  
In total two out of the 16 announcements of Thales or a percentage 12.5% 
presented statistically significant abnormal returns. In particular both of these 
announcements or a percentage of 20.5% resulted negative significant abnormal returns. 
The reaction of “EURONEXT 100” and “CAC 40” financial markets was as follows: 
None of the announcements in the “EURONEXT 100” stock market presented 














5/16/2006 Diehl -0.3390   -0.9565   
9/11/2006 SVS 0.3556   0.4214   
10/12/2006 ADI Group Holdings Pty 
Ltd 
0.1517   1.2401   
12/4/2006 Alcatel-Lucent 0.6892   -0.9839   
1/30/2007 DCN -0.6535   2.2159   
8/1/2008 Airbus unit Laupheim site 0.2635   -0.7939   
9/1/2008 Barco’s Software 
Development Unit 
1.2175   0.0802   
10/10/2008 nCipher PLC 0.7932   -0.7561   





Two out of eight announcements in the “CAC 40,” or 25%, presented statistically 














5/16/2006 Diehl -4.4572  >1% 2.5491 1%-5% 
9/11/2006 SVS 0.2728   1.2206   




  -0.0272   
12/4/2006 Alcatel-Lucent 0.0701   -1.2612   
1/30/2007 DCN 0.3395   0.8382   
8/1/2008 Airbus unit Laupheim site 0.9682   1.0701   




  0.9758 
 
  
10/10/2008 nCipher PLC 1.0516  -1.3911  10%-
20% 
Table 17.    Thales in “CAC 40” Arithmetic Return Events: Statistical Significance  
These results indicate that Thales’ announcements for consolidations or 
acquisitions of other companies had no effect on the stock price return in the 
“EURONEXT 100” stock market, while it negatively affected the stock price return in 
the “CAC 40” stock market 25% of the time. In particular, the two financial markets 
responded to the company’s consolidation strategy in the same manner in six out of eight 
common announcements (i.e., 75% of the time) and differently in two out of eight. In 
those, “EURONEXT 100” did not respond at all and “CAC 40” first responded slightly 
and in a negative manner.   
4. Finmeccanica 
Four announcements were examined for Finmeccanica for the period between 
2001 and 2009, and the same number of event studies executed. Table 18 presents in 
detail the results concerning the arithmetic return events for each announcement. One out 
of the four announcements, or 25%, presented statistically significant abnormal returns, 













3/30/2007 SELEX -0.9973  0.9198  
10/15/2007 REMINGTON -0.2939  -0.3047  
10/22/2008 DRS -4.0014 >1% -2.3971 1%-5% 
11/5/2008 EUROTECH 0.6649  -1.1415  
Table 18.    Finmeccanica Arithmetic Return Events: Statistical Significance  
These results indicate that Finmeccanica’s announcements for consolidations or 
acquisitions of other companies affected the stock price return in a negative manner, 25% 
of the time.  
Therefore, the market first responded slightly to the strategy of the company 
concerning consolidations, and did so in a negative manner. 
B. SUMMARY  
The results of the data analysis are summarized in Table 19, which presents the 
percentage of events experiencing statistically significant abnormal returns in total, the 
percentage of those that resulted in positive returns and the percentage that resulted in 











Percentage of Events 
Experiencing Positive  
Statistically Significant 
Abnormal Returns in 
Total 
Percentage of Events 
Experiencing Negative 
Statistically Significant 
Abnormal Returns in 
Total 
BAE Systems 67% 38% 29% 
EADS “EURONEXT 
100” 
22% 5% 17% 
EADS “CAC 40” 14% 9.5% 4.5% 
Thales “EURONEXT 
100” 
0% 0% 0% 
Thales  “CAC 40” 25% 0% 25% 
Finmeccanica 25% 0% 25% 
Total 30% 14% 16% 
Table 19.   Summary of Statistically Significant Events 
Summarizing the results of the data analysis, of the 80 examined event studies 
only 23 resulted in statistically significant returns the day of the announcement or the 
following date, which translates to a rate of almost 29%. Eleven announcements, (14%) 
resulted in positive abnormal returns and 12 announcements (15%) resulted in negative 
abnormal returns.  
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Figure 4 presents the results in a pie chart. 
 
 
Figure 4.   Percent of Events Presenting Statistically Significant Abnormal Returns 
Figure 5 presents the percentage of statistically significant abnormal returns that 
every company experienced from its examined consolidations. 
 
Figure 5.   Percentage of Statistically Significant Abnormal Returns in Relative Stock 
Market 
Figure 6 presents the percentage of the statistically significant abnormal returns 




Figure 6.   Percentage of Statistically Significant Abnormal Returns in Total 
From these statistically significant returns it is evident that the market responded 
more to BAE Systems’ consolidations, far above the mean of the examined 
consolidations. In particular, the market responded positively to BAE Systems’ 
announcements 38% of the time and negatively 29% of the time.  
The market responded to Finmeccanica’s consolidations with nearly the same 
total percentage of all examined consolidations. Specifically, the market responded 25% 
of the time in a negative manner. 
As for Thales, in “CAC 40” the market responded to the company’s 
consolidations with almost the same percentage in all the examined consolidations. That 
is, the market responded 25% of the time in a negative manner. 
The market responded to EADS’ announcements for consolidations in the 
“EURONEXT 100” and “CAC 40” markets 22 and 14.3% of the time, respectively. 
Those rates are close to the mean of the examined consolidations for “EURONEXT 100” 
and half the percentage for “CAC 40.” Specifically, in total the market responded 
positively eight % of the time and negatively 10% of the time. 
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Finally, the “EURONEXT 100” stock market did not respond at all to the 
announcements of consolidations of Thales, with 0% of the events experiencing 
statistically significant abnormal returns. 
As for the reaction of different markets to the same announcements, in the 
examined cases of EADS and Thales in both the “EURONEXT 100” and “CAC 40” 
stock markets, the results show that the markets responded practically the same in most 
of the cases. In particular the stock markets responded in the same manner in 22 out of 
the 26 common examined announcements that is nearly 85% of the time. 
Figure 7 presents the common reaction of EURONEXT 100” and “CAC 40” 
financial markets concerning the announcements of EADS and Thales. 
 
Figure 7.   Common Reaction of Stock Markets  
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V. CONCLUSIONS 
This project examines the statistically significant reaction of the financial markets 
to the top four European defense contractors’ announcements of consolidations for the 
period 2001–2009. Although this is a quantitative analysis, the authors make some 
qualitative assessment of the findings as well.  
The main conclusions, based on the results that were derived from the data 
analysis, can be summarized as follows: 
There was moderate statistically significant reaction of the financial markets to 
the announcements of consolidation. Specifically, the markets responded only 29% of the 
time and showed no response in the remaining 71% of announcements. Their responses 
were nearly evenly divided between positive and negative reaction, with 14% positive 
and 15% negative. The markets’ responses and their evaluations regarding each company 
are presented in a grade order as follows:  
1. From the data analysis it is obvious that BAE Systems seems to have 
triggered the financial markets most, with a percentage much above the mean (sixty-two 
percent 62% against 29 ). Also, its positive abnormal returns outnumber the negative 
ones. So, in the case of BAE Systems, the stock market anticipated that the 
announcement of consolidation would result in a more significant benefit than loss to the 
company and to its shareholders as well. 
2. Finmeccanica follows with a 25% statistically significant response, close 
to the mean, but all in a negative manner. In this case, the stock market responded 
somewhat to the announcements and, when it did, it expected that this action would result 
in a loss to the company and to the stockholders’ wealth. 
3. EADS comes in third, with statistically significant response. Also, the 
markets’ responses were more negative than positive. So, in the case of EADS, the stock 
markets anticipated that the announcement of consolidations would result more in a loss 
than a gain to the company and to the shareholders’ wealth. 
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4. Finally, the financial markets responded least to the announcements of 
Thales, with a percentage of 12.5, all negative. Hence, the stock markets responded 
mildly to the announcements, and in doing so expected that this action would result in a 
loss to the company and to the shareholders’ wealth.   
A. Two of the companies, EADS and Thales, were examined in 
different stock markets, “EURONEXT 100” and “CAC 40.” In both cases the reaction of 
the markets was nearly the same (89 and75%, respectively), and close to the mean (85%). 
The large percentages show that, regardless of the situations that might predominate in 
the two markets at a given time, they respond similarly to the same actions of the same 
companies.    
B. The findings of this project are mainly quantitative. Many factors 
led to these results and can be the basis for further research. Some of these factors are as 
follows:    
1. The examined defense contractors chose different strategies concerning 
the type and magnitude of mergers and acquisitions. BAE Systems seems to have chosen 
the consolidation of the U.K.’s national defense infrastructure into one company, with 
major transatlantic mergers and acquisitions in order to dominate Europe’s defense 
industry and to penetrate the U.S. defense market. On the other hand, EADS was formed 
via a merger of mergers, producing a firm that would strengthen its position in the world 
defense industry. Thales and Finmeccanica followed nearly the same strategy as EADS 
but to a lesser degree. Evaluating the results of the data analysis and the relative strategy 
of each company, it is evident that the financial markets expected that companies that 
choose aggressive strategies, which combine strengthening of their position with organic 
growth, would result in more significant gains than losses to the wealth of the company. 
That is why BAE Systems was graded first among the examined firms, not only with a 
considerable lead but with a more positive than negative impression as well. The strategy 
of the other companies not only did not trigger considerable response from the financial 
markets, but what response it did get tended to be negative.   
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2. In this study the statistically significant results of the arithmetic abnormal 
returns were examined at the time of the consolidation’s official announcement date. It is 
quite common that there could have been a leakage of information concerning the 
company’s intent to consolidate before the official announcement. Such pieces of 
information are usually exploited by the financial markets ad hoc, before the 
announcement of the final agreements. So, the markets may not have responded in the 
examined period of time, but in a different one, which cannot be easily traced. 
Nevertheless, taking into account all the assumptions, event studies will continue to be a 
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VI. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
This project focuses on a quantitative analysis of the statistically significant 
reaction of the stock markets to the consolidation announcements of the top four 
European defense contractors. During the research, some interesting questions were 
raised in addition to the primary and secondary research questions. Some of the most 
challenging research issues that intrigued the authors and could be the basis for future 
research are presented below: 
A. A QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE FACTS THAT INFLUENCED 
THE REACTION OF THE STOCK MARKETS. 
This project makes a quantitative analysis of the statistically significant reaction 
of the stock markets. It would be quite interesting to examine the factors that led the 
financial markets to react differently to the announcements for consolidations of the 
defense firms. The research can examine the status of the stock markets and the overall 
economy at certain periods of time (e.g., a “snapshot” of the market, if it was facing a 
gain or a loss and how the markets reacted to consolidations of different financial 
categories such as pharmaceutical, banking, defense, etc.). Also, it can examine the 
different strategies that every defense firm chose concerning the consolidations. For 
example, aggressive strategies with major mergers and acquisitions, conservative 
strategies with acquisitions of numerous small companies or mergers with companies 
focused on civilian activities. 
B. A QUANTITATIVE AND QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE 
STATISTICALLY SIGNIFICANT REACTION OF THE STOCK 
MARKETS TO THE ANNOUNCEMENTS OF JOINT VENTURES OF 
THE TOP FOUR EUROPEAN DEFENSE CONTRACTORS. 
The formation of joint ventures is a very common strategy in the European 
defense industry, since the creation of multinational consortia (like the Eurofighter 




In some cases joint ventures create greater promise for economic growth than mergers 
and acquisitions. So, the research on the statistically significant reaction of the stock 
markets to the announcements of joint ventures would be quite interesting.  
C. EXPAND THE RESEARCH FOR OTHER DEFENSE COMPANIES. 
This study focuses on the top four European defense firms. It would be interesting 
to examine the reaction of the financial markets to the announcements of consolidations 
of other well-known global defense contractors in the same or other continents (U.S., 
Asia, Australia). The research results from the other companies can be used together with 
the results of this project, as the primary elements for a wider quantitative and qualitative 
analysis of the impact of consolidations on the financial markets worldwide.  
D. IMPLEMENTATION OF OTHER MODELS AND TEST STATISTICS. 
The implementation of other multifactor and modified models, as well as the use 
of more sophisticated test statistics, may deal more effectively with various situations 
such as the uncertainty of the event date and the fluctuations of the variance during the 
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